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IRS CONFIDENTIALITY vs. FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT: THE CLASH CONTINUES
Craig J. Langstraat*
Access to taxpayer information is a continuing source of con-
frontation between private citizens and the Internal Revenue Service.
The proper statutory framework for judicial review is also controver-
sial with the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)1 and the Tax In-
formation Confidentiality Statute (IRC section 6103)2 vying for
supremacy. The importance and continuing nature of the dispute is
evidenced by several Federal Circuit Court of Appeals decisions over
the last seven years.
This article discusses the FOIA and IRC section 6103 as they
apply to taxpayer information requests. Existing Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals decisions are analyzed to document the current
state of the law and the extent of conflicts between the circuits. Fi-
nally, a proposed strategy for reconciliation is presented for possible
use in statutory amendments or in a United States Supreme Court
resolution.
I. THE STATUTES
The FOIA generally requires governmental agencies to make
information and records public,' unless a specific exemption is appli-
cable.4 The three most common FOIA exemptions utilized by the
government in defending against taxpayer requests for information
are as follows:
This section does not apply to matters that are -
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1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982).
2. I.R.C. § 6103 (1982).
3. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1982).
4. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1982).
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(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than
section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) re-
quires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a
manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes
particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types
of matters to be withheld;. . . (5) inter-agency or intra-agency
memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to
a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;...
(7) Investigatory records compiled for law enforcement pur-
poses, but only to the extent that the production of such records
would (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings, . .. ."'
Clearly, the FOIA "other statute" exception 6 will bring IRC
section 6103 into consideration for possible validation under that ex-
ception, as IRC section 6103 is a specific non-disclosure statute. IRC
section 6103 states a general rule of non-disclosure of returns and
return information as follows:
(a) GENERAL RULE - Returns and return information
shall be confidential, and except as authorized by this title-(1)
no officer or employee of the United States, (2) no officer or
employee of any State, any local child support enforcement
agency, or any local agency administering a program listed in
subsection (I)(7)(D) who has or had access to returns or return
information under this section, and (3) no other person (or of-
ficer or employee thereof) who has or had access to returns or
return information under subsection (e)(1)(D)(iii), paragraph
(2) or (4)(B) of subsection (m), or subsection (n), shall disclose
any return or return information obtained by him in any man-
ner in connection with his service as such an officer or an em-
ployee or otherwise or under the provisions of this section. For
purposes of this subsection, the term "officer employee" includes
a former officer or employee.'
An exception is provided to this general rule in the case of dis-
closure to a designee of the taxpayer (in the government's discretion)
as long as the disclosure would not "seriously impair Federal tax
administration." 8
5. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(3), 552(b)(5), 552(b)(7) (1982).
6. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1982) [hereinafter Exception 3].
7. I.R.C. § 6103(a) (1982), amended by I.R.C. §§ 610(a), 610(a)(1), 610(a)(2) (Supp.
I1 1985).
8. I.R.C. section 6103(c) states:
(c)DISCLOSURE OF RETURNS AND RETURN INFORMATION TO DESIGNEE
OF TAXPAYER
The secretary may, subject to such requirements and conditions as he may
prescribe by regulations, disclose the return of any taxpayer, or return informa-
[Vol. 28
1988] IRS CONFIDENTIALITY
With this elementary statutory background in place, and the
connection of these two statutes documented, it is time to turn to an
analysis of the several Federal Circuit Court of Appeals decisions on
the topic.
II. THE CIRCUIT COURT BATTLES
The first Federal Circuit Court of Appeals decision addressing
the interrelationship of the FOIA and IRC section 6103 (in their
current statutory form) was a Fifth Circuit case. In Chamberlain v.
Kurtz,9 the taxpayer brought suit under the FOIA to compel the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to disclose information and docu-
ments compiled during criminal and civil fraud investigations of the
taxpayer. After many disputes and several compromises, ninety one
documents were at issue.10
The government argued that IRC section 6103 satisfies the re-
quirements of Exception 3 of the FOIA" ("other statute excep-
tion"), thereby allowing non-disclosure if the Secretary of the Trea-
sury determines that such disclosure would seriously impair federal
tax administration. 2 In this context, the taxpayer argued that the
more stringent test of IRC section 6103(h)(4)"8 was applicable;
tion with respect to such taxpayer, to such person or persons as the taxpayer
may designate in a written request for or consent to such disclosure, or to any
other person at the taxpayer's request to the extent necessary to comply with a
request for information or assistance made by the taxpayer to such other person.
However, return information shall not be disclosed to such person or persons if
the Secretary determines that such disclosure would seriously impair Federal
tax administration.
I.R.C. § 6103(c) (1982).
9. 589 F.2d 827 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 842 (1980).
10. Chamberlain v. Kurtz, 589 F.2d 827, 832 (5th Cir. 1979).
11. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(c)(3) (1982).
12. Chamberlain, 589 F.2d at 835-37 (The court stated that it must first determine
which provisions of section 6103 govern the immediate facts, second whether those provisions
are of the type contemplated by exemption three, and third whether the documents at issue fall
within the ambit of section 6103.).
13. I.R.C. section 6103(h)(4), provides:
Disclosure to certain Federal officers and employees for purposes of tax admin-
istration, etc.
(4) Disclosure in judicial and administrative tax proceedings.-A return or re-
turn information may be disclosed in a Federal or State judicial or administra-
tive proceeding pertaining to tax administration, but only
(A) if the taxpayer is a party to such proceeding;
(B) if the treatment of an item reflected on such return is directly related to the
resolution of an issue in the proceeding;
(C) if such return or return information directly relates to a transactional rela-
tionship between a person who is a party to the proceeding and the taxpayer
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meaning that the Secretary could only avoid disclosure if the disclo-
sure would "identify a confidential informant or seriously impair a
civil or criminal tax investigation." 4 The Fifth Circuit quickly dis-
missed the argument. The court pointed out that the legislative his-
tory clearly identified IRC section 6103(c) as the provision applica-
ble to taxpayers requesting information about their own situations."5
IRC section 6103(h), however, only applies to disclosure of tax in-
formation to federal officers and employees for the purpose of tax
administration. 6
The next analysis for the Fifth Circuit was whether the terms
of IRC section 6103(c) satisfied the requirement of Exemption 3 of
the FOIA. The court considered whether IRC section 6103(c) estab-
lished "particular criteria for withholding information or referred to
particular types of matters to be withheld.""' After review of the
legislative history of both statutes, 8 the court concluded that IRC
section 6103(c) qualifies under Exemption 3 of the FOIA. 9
Having adopted the IRC section 6103(c) standard of avoiding
disclosure that would "seriously impair Federal tax administration,"
the court, in a de novo review, examined the documents in question20
which directly affects the resolution of an issue in the proceeding; or
(D) to the extent required by order of a court pursuant to section 3500 of title
18, United States Code, or rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
such court being authorized in the issuance of such order to give due considera-
tion to Congressional policy favoring the confidentiality of returns and return
information as set forth in this title.
I.R.C. § 6103(h)(4) (1984).
However, such return or return information shall not be disclosed as provided in sub-
paragraph (A), (B), or (C) if the Secretary determines that such disclosure would identify a
confidential informant or seriously impair a civil or criminal tax investigation.
14. See Chamberlain, 589 F.2d at 837-38. The plaintiff argued subsection (h)(4) ap-
plied because the facts involved "a Federal or State judicial or administrative proceeding per-
taining to tax administration." Id. The court rejected this argument.
15. Id. at 838 (subsection 6103(c) and (e)(6) address the taxpayer's right to address
their files).
16. Id.
17. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1982).
18. The court notes that substantial amendments to both statutes were adopted by Con-
gress within a month of each other in 1976; government in the Sunshine Act (FOIA) and Tax
Reform Act of 1976 (section 6103). See Chamberlain, 589 F.2d at 840.
19. Chamberlain, 589 F.2d at 838-39 (based on the language and Legislative history of
Exemption 3, 610(c) and 610(e)(6) are sufficiently specific to satisfy the requirements of part
B of Exemption 3 that a statute either establishes particular criteria for withholding informa-
tion or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld).
20.
[V]arious intra-agency memoranda analyzing and discussing Chamberlain's tax
liability, several summaries of the case, memoranda of interviews with wit-
nesses, assorted agency workpapers dealing with the computation of Chamber-
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and determined that they were protected from disclosure under this
standard. This conclusion was based on the Fifth Circuit's percep-
tion that the requested documents would seriously impair the gov-
ernment's attempts to collect back taxes and fraud penalties from the
taxpayer.21
The Eighth Circuit was the next participant in this FOIA/IRC
section 6103 controversy. In Barney v. IRS.,22 a taxpayer filed a
FOIA suit to disclose information accumulated during a pending in-
vestigation for failure to file income tax returns (including criminal
fraud). The government claimed protection under Exception 7 of the
FOIA2" (interference with law enforcement proceedings) and, alter-
natively, Exception 3 of the FOIA (through IRC section 6103).
The Eighth Circuit relied on the United States Supreme
Court's opinion in NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co.24 to derive
its authority to make a decision under Exception 7 to the FOIA that
"with respect to particular kinds of enforcement proceedings, disclo-
sure of particular kinds of investigatory records while a case is still
pending would generally 'interfere with enforcement proceed-
ings.' "25 Based on its review of descriptions of requested documents
and governmental affidavits, 6 the Eighth Circuit held that the docu-
ments requested by the taxpayer 27 would necessarily interfere with
governmental proceedings by prematurely revealing the government's
case. 28
Having decided for the government on the basis of Exception 7
lain's taxes, reports by different agents who have worked on the case, and letters
or memoranda from one IRS official to another dealing with different aspects of
the case. These documents include intra-agency communications regarding
Chamberlain's tax liability, memoranda of conferences on that subject, various
"sensitive case" reports on this case, the testimony of an important witness
before a grand jury ...
Id. at 840.
21. Id. at 841 (since all of the documents sought by plaintiff discussed either facts or
law relating to the fraud claim against him, their release would aid the taxpayer's defense of
back-taxes claims).
22. 618 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1980).
23. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1982) [hereinafter Exception 7].
24. 437 U.S. 214 (1978).
25. Barney v. IRS, 618 F.2d 1268, 1273 (8th Cir. 1980) (quoting N.L.R.B. v. Robbins
Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 236 (1978)).
26. The court also held on an additional issue that an in camera inspection of docu-
ments was not necessary for a valid determination. Id. at 1272. Contra Stephenson v. IRS, 688
F.2d 1140 (5th Cir. 1980).
27. "[W]itness statements, documentary evidence, agent's work papers and internal
agency memoranda . Barney, 618 F.2d at 1273.
28. Id.
19881
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to the FOIA, the court found it unnecessary to analyze the correla-
tion between the FOIA and IRC section 6103. However, the then
recently-decided Chamberlain" case was favorably discussed in a
dicta footnote to the Eighth Circuit's opinion. 0
The next decision to be discussed in this disclosure controversy
was rendered by the Seventh Circuit in King v. IRS31 While this
case did not involve a taxpayer request for his/her own return infor-
mation, the case does address the FOIA/IRC section 6103 overlap
and provides analysis used in subsequent court decisions.
The plaintiff in King made FOIA requests for disclosure of cer-
tain documents related to previously issued revenue rulings and reg-
ulations.8" After spending a large part of the opinion determining
that these documents fit the definition of "return information" under
IRC section 6103, the Seventh Circuit addressed the issue of whether
IRC section 6103 exclusively controlled disclosure, or whether the
provisions of the FOIA also applied.
Relying on the analysis of a United States district court deci-
sion,88 the Seventh Circuit held that IRC section 6103 is the exclu-
sive source for determinations regarding disclosure of tax return in-
formation.84  The basic reasoning cited is that Congressional
enactment of IRC section 6103 with full knowledge of the FOIA,
demonstrates an intention to protect tax return information from the
public disclosure otherwise mandated by the FOIA."8
The effect of this interpretation is to place a reviewing court in
the position of either accepting the government's determination that
disclosure of any subject's tax return information "would seriously
impair federal tax administration," or merely applying an "arbitrary
or capricious" judicial review standard.3 6 This approach is contrary
to the FOIA approach requiring a de novo judicial review of any
29. 589 F.2d 827 (5th Cir. 1979).
30. Barney, 618 F.2d at 1274 n.15.
31. 688 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding section 6103 controlled, consequently, since
the plaintiff did not fall within any of the categories of persons authorized to receive return
information per 6103(e), release of the eight documents sought was improperly ordered by the
lower court).
32. Id. at 489.
33. Zale Corp. v. IRS, 481 F. Supp. 486 (D.D.C. 1979) (specifically rejecting prospec-
tive pre-emption by the FOIA and pointing out that IRC section 6103 was enacted after the
FOIA, which is framed in general terms).
34. King v. IRS, 688 F.2d 488, 495 (7th Cir. 1982). (Zale Corp., was the leading case
on whether the FOIA or section 6103 governs the release of return information).
35. Id.
36. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982).
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rejected disclosure, 7 as utilized in Chamberlain, with the govern-
ment sustaining the burden of non-disclosure.
The Seventh Circuit extended this analysis to a taxpayer re-
quest for his own return information in Cheek v. IRS" Here, the
taxpayer sued under the FOIA to obtain information from IRS files
about his own tax returns. The court summarily dismissed the tax-
payer's appeal based on its holding in King with a statement that
"disclosure of tax return information is governed by section 6103
rather that by the Freedom of Information Act .. .""
Then, the recently created Eleventh Circuit4 considered this is-
sue in Currie v. IRS.41 The taxpayer's in this case sued under the
FOIA to force the disclosure of documents relating to civil and crimi-
nal investigations brought against them.4 2 The IRS argued that IRC
section 6103 was the sole statutory scheme regulating the disclosure
of tax return information."' The court, however, referring to the
Chamberlain4 4 case held that while IRC section 6103 does qualify
under Exception 3 of the FOIA, the review procedures of the FOIA
still apply to a decision reached under the standards of IRC section
6103. 45
Of interest is the fact that the district court in this case had
completed a de novo review including some in camera inspection of
documents.46 Based on its review, the district court denied disclo-
37. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1982).
38. 703 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1983) (the court supported its analysis with a Senate report
indicating Congress intended the Tax Reform Act to override inconsistent prior statutes).
39. Id. at 271.
40. Created October 1, 1981 from the Fifth Circuit.
41. 704 F.2d 523, 527 n.8 (11th Cir. 1983).
42. The documents at issue consist of internal agency memoranda reflecting the
direction and scope of the investigation of the appellants' tax liability, memo-
randa of interviews with witnesses and confidential informants, correspondence
with a state law enforcement agency and other third parties, information re-
ceived from third parties relating to financial transactions with the appellants,
federal tax returns of third parties, and IRS personnels' notes and work papers
concerning the scope and direction of the investigation.
Id. at 531.
43. Id. at 526.
44. Id. at 527 n.8. The court in Currie explained: "The Eleventh Circuit, in the en
banc decision of Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981), adopted as
precedent the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit decided prior to October 1, 1981." Id.
45. Currie v. IRS, 704 F.2d 523, 527-28 (11th Cir. 1983) (the court explained a non-
disclosure decision that could pass the stringent FOIA requirements must have a rational
basis).
46. Id. at 530 (in camera inspection by the court is reviewable only for abuse of
discretion).
1988]
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sure. 47 Since the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the standard of review
used by the district court, its review of the lower court decision was
limited by a "clearly erroneous" standard."8 The appellate court
found that the district court's review was adequate (not clearly erro-
neous).' 9 So in this case, even though the taxpayer prevailed as to
the standard of review (FOIA de novo review), the disclosures were
still denied.
The Sixth Circuit became involved in the controversy with
White v. IRS.50 The taxpayer again sued the IRS under the FOIA
after his request for disclosure of documents relating to his criminal
tax investigation was denied.5' The IRS again adopted the position
that IRC section 6103 was the sole standard for determination of
proper disclosure, with an alternative argument that the implemen-
tation of IRC section 6103 through exemption (b)3 of the FOIA
would yield the same non-disclosure decision. 2
The district court53 adopted the exclusive IRC section 6103 in-
terpretation and only conducted an "arbitrary or capricious" re-
view. " ' The Sixth Circuit approved this analysis and agreed with the
lower court that disclosure of the subject documents was not re-
quired.55 The court did continue, however, to analyze the alternative
argument that the implementation of IRC section 6103 through Ex-
ception 3 of the FOIA would yield the same non-disclosure deci-
sion.5 As pointed out in a concurring opinion, this analysis of the
alternative argument was unnecessary to the decision.5" The majority
opinion concluded that the same non-disclosure would be applicable
under a FOIA analysis.5
The Fifth Circuit reaffirmed its position in the continuing con-
47. Id. at 526.
48. Id. at 531. Before proceeding to the "clearly erroneous" test, the court first deter-
mined that the district court had an adequate factual basis in framing propriety of non-disclo-
sure as an issue.
49. Id.
50. 707 F.2d 897 (6th Cir. 1983).
51. Id. at 898. The requested information included materials pertaining to alleged un-
derpayment of tax and the method by which the taxpayer was selected for an investigation or
audit.
52. Id.
53. White v. IRS, 528 F. Supp. 119 (N.D. Ohio 1981).
54. White v. IRS, 707 F.2d 897, 900 (6th Cir. 1983).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 902.
58. Id. at 901 (the court also held that additional detailed in camera inspection was not
required).
[Vol. 28
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troversy with Linsteadt v. IRS 59 The court held that the FOIA re-
view and burden standards were applicable to any IRC section 6103
disclosure evaluations." The disappointing result from a taxpayer
perspective, however, is that even under the favorable fact situation
of this case, disclosure was not mandated by the court.
The sole document in dispute was part of an interview memo-
randum which contained only taxpayer statements to an Internal
Revenue Agent.6' The IRS stipulated that the contested memoran-
dum "contained only a factual summary of the Linsteadts' state-
ments, and did not include any conclusions or opinions of the Special
Agent who took the statements." '62
The IRS argued that the disclosure of the taxpayers' own state-
ments (which could be introduced in any subsequent trial as admis-
sions) would give the taxpayers the opportunity to construct defenses
and tamper with evidence, thereby seriously impairing federal tax
administration or interfering with law enforcement proceedings." A
sharply divided Fifth Circuit panel (2 to 1) held that the lower court
had not committed "manifest error" in determining that the IRS had
met its burden under the FOIA implementing IRC section 6103.64
Therefore, the taxpayers were precluded from obtaining an IRS rec-
ord of their own statements.
The Ninth Circuit's contribution to the controversy is contained
in the Long cases. The latest Long decision describes the history of
the prior cases.6" The taxpayers sought access to statistical informa-
tion used to develop computer programs6 that selected income tax
returns for possible audit.6"
In Long v. IRS 6 8 (the original case) the taxpayers sued the IRS
to force disclosure of the TCMP statistical data.69 The Ninth Circuit
59. 729 F.2d 998 (5th Cir. 1984).
60. Id. at 1003.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1004 (stipulation made in a hearing on the government's motion for summary
judgment).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1005 (dissenting judge could not agree that the evils cited by the government
to justify non-disclosure reasonably came to pass, given the contents of the withheld document).
65. Long v. United States, 742 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1984) (the court briefly summarized
its previous treatment of the disclosure issue in Long v. IRS. 596 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 917 (1980)).
66. Discriminate Function (DIF) System. The basis for audit selection under this
method is variance of deductions claimed for expected levels calculated from the TCMP
information.
67. Long, 742 F.2d at 1175.
68. 596 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 917 (1980).
69. This is known as the Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP). This
19883
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tried to determine whether the TCMP computer tapes were in fact
"records" under the existing IRC section 6103, and whether the case
should be remanded to the district court for its determination of
whether such disclosure would pose a significant risk of indirect
identification of taxpayers.70
The same taxpayers filed a similar case against the Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA) seeking to force the BEA to disclose cer-
tain TCMP computer tapes in its possession.71 These tapes had been
transferred by the IRS for the BEA's use in estimating the total na-
tional income account. The Ninth Circuit held that the tapes were
subject to disclosure, but the United States Supreme Court granted a
stay pending certiorari.
As a response in part to these two cases, 78 Congress amended
IRC section 6103 to its current form, allowing denial of disclosure if
in governmental discretion the disclosure would "seriously impair as-
sessment, collection, or enforcement under the internal revenue
laws."'74 The Supreme Court subsequently remanded the BEA v.
Long case to the Ninth Circuit to be reconsidered in light of the IRC
section 6103 amendments. 7 The Ninth Circuit in turn remanded the
case back to the district court for the same reconsideration.7 ' The
BEA and IRS cases were consolidated on remand and are the subject
of the latest Ninth Circuit Long decision.
7 7
The key issue in the latest Long decision is the proper standard
of review in a FOIA/IRC section 6103 overlap situation. The Ninth
Circuit dismissed the IRS argument that IRC section 6103 is the
exclusive test for determining disclosure of tax return information,
but rather determined that the full FOIA de novo review and IRS
burden of proof standards apply.7 ' The opinion cites statutory con-
program attempts to measure the level of taxpayer compliance with the tax law.
70. See Long, 742 F.2d at 1176.
71. Long v. BEA, 646 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1981).
72. Long, 742 F.2d at 1176 (the court granted certiorari in light of Congress' addition of
the Economic Recovery Tax Act amendment to I.R.C. section 6103).
73. H.R. REP. No. 201, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 238-39 (1981).
74. I.R.C. § 6103(b)(2) (1982).
75. BEA v. Long, 454 U.S. 934 (1981). The Court in Long held "the policies expressed
in I.R.C. section 6103 could be reconciled with the FOIA through exemption 3 which incorpo-
rates criteria contained in non-disclosure statutes." Id. at 974.
76. Long v. BEA, 671 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir. 1982).
77. Long, 742 F.2d at 1176 (the court raised the issue of whether the federal statute is
an exemption statute).
78. Id. at 1183 (specifically, the court emphasized the district court's review is still de
novo and the court must satisfy itself, on the basis of detailed and nonconclusory affidavits, that
the Commissioner is correct).
[Vol. 28
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struction, legislative history, and lack of specificity in excluding the
FOIA requirements as reasons for its decision.79
Even this decision was not the end of the Long cases. The cases
were again remanded to the district court for a comprehensive de
novo review, as the district court had restricted its alleged de novo
review to determining the factual existence of the government's de-
termination of harm, rather than an independent determination of
potential harm.8
III. THE LAST BATTLE?
The Third Circuit is the most recent participant in the FOIA/
IRC section 6103 confrontation in Grasso v. IRS."' Here, as in the
Linsteadt case, the taxpayer was suing only to obtain full disclosure
of an IRS interview memorandum detailing statements the taxpayer
had made to the IRS. 2 The IRS had provided portions of the memo,
but other portions had been deleted. 8
The IRS again argued that IRC section 6103 was the sole stat-
utory framework for determining disclosure requirements. The
Third Circuit dismissed the IRS's argument based on the statutory
analysis articulated by the Ninth Circuit in its latest Long decision.8
The court held that the de novo review requirements contained in
the FOIA were applicable to any IRC section 6103 analysis through
Exception 3 of the FOIA.8"
In this case, the district court had performed the required de
novo review and determined that the government had not met its
burden of proof by determining either that the disputed information
79. Id. at 1177-78. The court found that section 6103 was reconcilable with the FOIA
because prior court decisions held that section 6103 qualified as an exemption statute under 5
U.S.C. § 553(b)(3). Moreover, the court held that neither section 6103 nor its legislative his-
tory contain any language supporting its exclusion from the FOIA. In fact, Congress had
amended section 6103 by adding 6110 which expressly excluded itself from the FOIA. The
court pointed out that Congress' failure to likewise amend section 6103 is "highly persuasive"
of an intent not to preempt the procedural provisions of the FOIA as to requests under section
6103.
80. Id. at 1184. The district court did not review the Commissioner's determination that
disclosure of the specific TCMP data sought by plaintiffs would seriously impair assessment,
collection, or enforcement of the tax laws. However, the court held that such a finding by the
Commissioner was subject to de novo review in an action to compel disclosure under the
FOIA.
81. 785 F.2d 70 (3d Cir. 1986).
82. Id. at 72.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 74.
85. Id.
19881
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
would "interfere with enforcement proceedings"" 6 or "seriously im-
pair Federal tax administration. '87 The Third Circuit sustained the
district court's decision,"' even though the IRS argued that the dis-
puted information would refresh the taxpayer's recollection, "thereby
revealing the names and witnesses or potential witnesses, and trans-
actions being investigated."8 9
IV. THE SCORECARD AND THE GAME PLAN
After several years of litigation at the circuit court of appeals
level, the score is as follows. Two circuits (Sixth and Seventh) have
held the IRC section 6103 is the exclusive statutory reference to de-
termine whether governmental disclosure of tax return information is
required. This means that once the government has made a determi-
nation that disclosure is not required, the reviewing court is limited
to an examination of whether that determination was arbitrary or an
abuse of discretion.
Four circuits (Third, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh) have held that
the de novo review and governmental burden standards of the FOIA
apply to any disclosure determination under IRC section 6103. The
Eighth Circuit has also favorably cited the Fifth Circuit's Chamber-
lain decision in a dicta footnote.
The time is certainly ripe for a final resolution of the contro-
versy. There are two possible avenues for resolution. The first possi-
bility is the granting of a petition for certiorari by the United States
Supreme Court. At this point the Supreme Court has not demon-
strated enthusiasm for such action. The only time the Supreme
Court became involved in this issue was to grant a stay of disclosure
pending certiorari.9"
The more practical course of action is to bring this issue to the
attention of the Congress for resolution. One simple statutory addi-
tion could clarify the Congressional intent in these types of situa-
tions. Since Congressional intent is not clear, as evidenced by the
split of circuits, it is in fact a duty of Congress to clarify its position.
The best clarification would be for Congress to stipulate that
the protection of the FOIA apply to a review of disputed tax return
information disclosures. The policy of de novo review and burden of
86. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A) (1982).
87. I.R.C. § 6103(e)(7) (1982).
88. Grasso v. IRS, 785 F.2d 70, 77 (3d Cir. 1976).
89. Id. at 76.
90. See BEA v. Long, 454 U.S. 934 (1981).
[Vol. 28
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proof for non-disclosure on the government assures independent con-
sideration of governmentally-rejected disclosures. The federal courts
are well-equipped to utilize these standards based on their experi-
ence with other types of FOIA disputes.
The importance of these protections is best illustrated in the
cases where the taxpayers are seeking disclosure of their own state-
ments from the IRS (i.e., Linsteadt and Grasso). Clearly, funda-
mental fairness requires an independent de novo review to fully pro-
tect the rights of taxpayers already in an adversary relationship with
the IRS.
V. CONCLUSION
The resolution of the conflict as to whether the review stan-
dards of the FOIA apply to disputed tax return information disclo-
sures under IRC section 6103 is long overdue. Litigant and court
resources are being wasted by repeated litigation of this issue. Con-
gress should act to clarify its intention, with the best course being to
provide FOIA review standards for tax return information disclosure
disputes.
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